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a b s t r a c t
The bullwhip effect has long been recognized as a critical factor that ampliﬁes demand variability as
customer orders pass upstream through successive tiers of a supply chain. Like customer demand,
environmental requirements also change signiﬁcantly at times, and are passed along the supply chain to
varying degrees, suggestive of what we term, the “green bullwhip effect”. Based on ﬁeld cases exploring
changes in three supply chains across three adjacent tiers, we ﬁnd evidence that such a phenomenon
exists. First, ratcheting demands for better environmental performance are passed upstream through
successive tiers with signiﬁcant variation. Second, a green bullwhip effect is created as time to comply
with speciﬁcations is compressed. Four different managerial responses, namely replace, accommodate,
negotiate and collaborate, were observed to amplify or attenuate a green bullwhip effect based on the
nature of ﬁrm relationships and balance of environmental capabilities at each tier. Of particular interest,
the green bullwhip effect can force positive change, triggering the development of new environmental
capabilities at multiple tiers in a supply chain.
& 2014 The Authors. Published by Elsevier B.V. This is an open access article under the CC BY-NC-ND
license (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/3.0/).
1. Introduction
Over the last decade, as regional manufacturing has evolved
into global supply chains, customer concerns and regulatory
changes have increasingly focused on environmental attributes
implicitly embedded in raw materials, components and ﬁnished
goods. These environmental concerns have been enacted into
public policies that capture the broader life-cycle of products,
and therefore, ﬁrms increasingly have faced a wide range of
environmental risks linked to their supply chains (Handﬁeld
et al., 2005). For instance, the unfortunate position that Sony
found itself in 2001 illustrates the complex interplay of factors
when product-based regulations are introduced. At that time,
Dutch customs agents stopped nearly 1.3 million PlayStation
consoles being imported into Europe because the cables contained
levels of cadmium that exceeded the Netherlands' new environ-
mental regulations. Sony had to bear signiﬁcant costs for replacing
the parts, storing goods and repackaging the ﬁnal products
(Carlton, 2006). After this incident, Sony accelerated its Green
Partnership program in order to integrate environmental
considerations across its global supply chain. In a similar manner,
original equipment manufacturers (OEMs) have introduced envir-
onmental criteria in their supplier selection process (Bai and
Sarkis, 2010), required environmental audits and certiﬁcation
schemes (e.g., ISO14001) from suppliers, and provided them with
environmental training, education and other support (Rao and
Holt, 2005; Lee and Klassen, 2008).
As seen in Sony's case, signiﬁcant changes that improve the
environmental performance of products and suppliers – often
initiated by regulation – ﬂow back upstream in the supply chain
with uncertain consequences. Moreover, the level of pressure can
vary greatly from one tier in the supply chain to another (e.g.,
OEM, ﬁrst-tier supplier and second-tier supplier). For example,
while upstream suppliers usually face less intense scrutiny from
consumers and governments, they are often under considerable
pressure from indirect regulations that are conveyed by customer
ﬁrms (Green et al., 2000). At this point, we have little under-
standing about how quickly and to what extent more stringent
requirements from markets or product-based regulations affect
the supply chains of materials, components and subassemblies.
A growing number of studies have examined operational
approaches that address environmental issues in supply chains,
termed green supply chain management (GSCM). This literature
has identiﬁed management practices (e.g., Min and Galle, 2001;
Vachon and Klassen, 2006), explored internal and external drivers
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of practice, and assessed performance outcomes (e.g., Rao and
Holt, 2005; Sarkis et al., 2010; Wu et al., 2012; Zhu and Sarkis,
2004). However, this research has largely adopted a static view,
whereby suppliers are simply expected to meet new requirements
and improve their environmental performance as new demands
are placed on them, possibly coincident with developmental
support from next-tier customers (e.g., Lee et al., 1997a;
Machuca and Barajas, 2004).
In contrast, the broader supply chain management literature
has emphasized the behaviors of buyers and suppliers from a
dynamic perspective. In particular, the bullwhip effect is well
known to illustrate how and why orders or information change as
they pass along a supply chain, and how multiple tiers in the
supply chain respond to this distortion of information. By exten-
sion, it is conceivable that new insights might be gained by
considering potential dynamic behaviors in the context of envir-
onmental or social issues.
Given this promise, our research explores several questions.
How do focal ﬁrms manage their supply base in response to
signiﬁcant changes in environmental requirements? More speciﬁ-
cally, how are environmental requirements of customers adjusted
as they transfer upstream in supply chains? In addressing these
questions, this paper makes three contributions. First, this study
extends existing literature by synthesizing earlier research areas,
namely environmental management and supply chain dynamics,
to propose a dynamic phenomenon whereby environmental
obligations ﬂow back upstream in the supply chain with signiﬁ-
cant variation, termed the green bullwhip effect. Second, this
research offers empirical evidence for such a phenomenon from
case studies at multiple tiers in three different supply chains.
Third, our case studies are combined with the previous literature
to construct an integrative framework that illustrates both the
dynamics and potential managerial responses to tightening envir-
onmental regulations in the supply chain. Thus, the challenges and
management actions arising from the green bullwhip effect
establish the groundwork for a set of research propositions.
2. Foundational literature and concept development
To explore the dynamic nature of environmental issues in the
supply chain, two broad streams of research are particularly
informative: green supply chain management and supply chain
dynamics. Combined, the former explores how environmental
issues are characterized in the supply chain and the latter provides
a basis for understanding the green bullwhip effect.
2.1. Green supply chain management
With the emergence of environment issues as a legitimate
business concern in supply chain management, research has exam-
ined a wide range of issues under the umbrella of green supply chain
management (GSCM), including practices, drivers, and outcomes
(Zhu and Sarkis, 2006). More speciﬁcally, previous literature has
characterized various elements of GSCM practices, ranging from
green purchasing (e.g., Min and Galle, 2001), to environmental
integration with customers and suppliers (e.g., Vachon and Klassen,
2006, 2008), to a closed-loop supply management (e.g., Kleindorfer
et al., 2005). For example, Bowen et al. (2001) distinguished between
“practices that green the supply process” and “product-based green
supply practices” by differentiating between managing supplier risk
and performance, and supply chain integration for sustainable
products, respectively. Vachon and Klassen (2006, 2008) addressed
two broad sets of GSCM practices: monitoring and collaboration.
Monitoring generally relates to supplier and material selection
practices, whereas collaboration focuses more on building suppliers'
environmental capabilities. Zhu and Sarkis (2004, 2006) proposed a
broader perspective of practices, including internal environmental
management, green purchasing, investment recovery, eco-design
practices, and cooperation with supply chain partners.
Second, several drivers for the adoption of GSCM have been
identiﬁed. While pressure from multiple stakeholders is impor-
tant, two groups of stakeholders are of particular relevance:
customers and governments (Seuring and Müller, 2008). Green
et al. (2000) provided empirical evidence that regulations played
the strongest role in inﬂuencing environmental improvement,
followed by market pressures. Of course, not all ﬁrms are exposed
to the same types of regulations or pressures. Large, high-proﬁle
ﬁrms tend to face considerable pressure to improve their environ-
mental performance; in contrast, smaller suppliers or suppliers
distant from the end-consumer, have few obvious incentives. Yet,
environmental pressures still are often passed upstream to sup-
pliers, including smaller ﬁrms, from buying ﬁrms (Hall, 2000).
Collectively, the literature on environmental issues and supply
chain management clearly has identiﬁed that regulatory and
customer demands prompt GSCM practices in a focal ﬁrm,
although with little research into the underlying dynamics. Of
note, Hill (1997) recognized the importance of supply chain
dynamics and its linkage to environmental pressures. Hall (2000)
pointed out that buyer–supplier relationships play a crucial role in
transferring environmental pressure and stimulating environmen-
tal change within the supply chain.
Some evidence has emerged that both a focal ﬁrm's power
within the supply chain and its technical capabilities are critical to
diffuse the environmental innovation upstream when faced with
stakeholder pressure to improve environmental performance. For
example, Cousins et al. (2004) took a contingent perspective in
characterizing GSCM strategies, and identiﬁed four generic strate-
gies based on the level of perceived environmental risks and the
resources available to the ﬁrm: “why bother”, “no choice”, “enthu-
siasts”, and “go ﬁrst”. Their model assumed that the greater the
level of perceived risks to the ﬁrm and available resources, the
greater the likelihood that a ﬁrm will react in some way to
minimize the expectation of the loss related to the risks. Of
particular note, their study recognizes that GSCM strategy might
be adjusted as circumstances change.
2.2. Bullwhip effect
Within operations and supply chain management, the demand-
related bullwhip effect is well known: variability in customer
demand often becomes ampliﬁed as orders pass upstream in a
supply chain. In general, three characteristics are evident: oscillation,
ampliﬁcation and phase-lag (Forrester, 1961; Lee et al., 1997b).
Oscillations and ampliﬁcation occur as orders boom and bust over
time, causing excessive inventories, and thus variance in order size
increases as orders pass upstream in the supply chain. Phase lags
indicate that inventory levels peak, potentially followed by backlogs,
delayed to some extent at each subsequent tier in the supply chain.
This phenomenon is costly because it causes excessive inventories,
unsatisfactory customer service and uncertain production planning.
Previous research on the bullwhip effect has explored both
underlying causes and options for its alleviation. The underlying
operational causes include the distortion of information, increas-
ing batch size to reduce setup costs, rationing of inventory, and
logistics delays (Lee et al., 1997a). Each cause can be complicated
by a variety of managerial decision-making heuristics and
bounded rationality (e.g., Sterman, 1989). For example, informa-
tion transferred in the form of orders tends to become distorted as
ﬁrms seek to protect themselves from demand uncertainty or
shipping delays. Also, some members of the supply chain do not
adequately account for time delays when ordering, expecting
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faster shipment. However, others point out that the bullwhip
effect is an outcome of the strategic interactions among rational
supply chain members (e.g., Lee et al., 1997b). Uncertainty about
the actions of other decision makers is also identiﬁed as a trigger
for instability (Croson et al., 2014). Collectively, insufﬁcient coor-
dination between supply chain partners and the critical interaction
between bounded rationality and rationing gaming have been
revealed as the primary causes for the bullwhip effect.
Faced with this range of causes, a corresponding array of
remedies for reducing and mitigating the bullwhip effect has been
identiﬁed, including information sharing, integrated supply chain
information system, joint planning, vendor-managed inventory,
shorter lead times, and synchronized deliveries (e.g., Lee et al.,
1997b; Larson and Kulchitsky, 2000; Disney and Towill, 2003;
Machuca and Barajas, 2004). Frequent communication can facilitate
the transparency of information ﬂow from the market to the
suppliers, and vice versa, thereby reducing uncertainty (Holweg
et al., 2005). Enhancing visibility across the supply chain using
information technology is also considered an effective means to
alleviate the bullwhip effect; operational capabilities that enable
timely response to customer demands across multiple tiers of the
supply chain are another critical factor to mitigate the bullwhip effect
(Lee et al., 1997b). Thus, remedies come in many forms with a
common goal to create a transparent, visible demand pattern that
paces the entire supply chain (Holweg et al., 2005), while contribut-
ing to better coordination and collaboration as learning is transferred
along the supply chain (Arshinder et al., 2008; Wu and Katok, 2006).
2.3. Environmental requirements and the bullwhip effect
Green supply chain management has explored both strategic
and tactical considerations. At a minimum, two critical aspects
include greener design deﬁned across a product's entire life-cycle
(i.e., pre-manufacture, manufacture, distribution, use and end-of-
life fate), and an extended view of a supply chain, encompassing
the potential for remanufacturing and recycling (Srivastava, 2007;
Klassen and Vachon, 2012). These aspects are quite consistent with
recent efforts by government agencies to enact regulations that
force manufacturers to “build in” better environmental perfor-
mance, often through improved recyclability or the removal of
toxic substances in the product. In general, original equipment
manufacturers (OEMs) are the target of these product-based
environmental regulations. Considering that society's environ-
mental concerns often are eventually enacted into public policies,
emerging product-based regulations often reﬂect consumer
demands for environmentally friendlier products.
In general, how do such regulations affect upstream suppliers
across multiple tiers? First, a level of stringency might be imposed
somewhere between two possible extremes. At one extreme, ﬁrms
might work collectively toward a single uniﬁed target that is
implemented on the schedule dictated by regulation. Doing so
would potentially reduce the total cost of compliance, and allow
for maximum time to adjust and optimize supply processes and
material selection. This is analogous to information sharing and
synchronized delivery.
At the other extreme, OEMs could respond with behaviors that
parallel those that trigger the classic demand-related bullwhip
effect. Environmental obligations, as speciﬁed by customers and
each successive tier in the supply chain, are conveyed upstream as
buying speciﬁcations (Green et al., 2000). Most importantly, these
obligations need not match the regulations. Thus, a focal ﬁrm
might require more stringent environmental performance of their
suppliers than that demanded by regulations, thereby imposing
indirect “regulations”. This is not unlike the strategies referred to
by Lee et al. (1997a) as “rationing and shortage gaming,” adopted
to counteract opportunistic or ill-equipped suppliers. Conceivably,
OEMs tighten the requirements or build-in a safety margin “just-
in-case” the supplier misses the mark by some (uncertain) degree.
In addition to more stringent requirements, a focal ﬁrm might
move aggressively ahead of the regulatory deadlines in order to create
a time buffer. Recall that barriers to GSCM practices include poor
supplier commitment, cost, and apparent legitimacy, to name a few
(Walker et al., 2008). For example, powerful suppliers might withhold
proprietary information, such as chemical composition necessary for
product redesign (Dillon and Baram, 1993), industry-speciﬁc norms
might slow the adoption of greener practices, customers might resist
new concepts (Mollenkopf et al., 2010), and small suppliers might
delay implementation because of limited capabilities (Lee and Klassen,
2008). Thus, a range of causes similar to those of the bullwhip effect
(e.g., distortion of information, limited information sharing, delays
ultimately due to bounded rationality of the actors) suggest that any
changes will not be processed simultaneously along the supply chain.
Given risk aversion to missing deadlines for regulatory compliance,
ﬁrms must build in a buffer to adapt to uncertainty in suppliers'
timing. More speciﬁcally, focal ﬁrms might adopt a phase-leading
approach toward their suppliers, which shifts the deadline for
compliance earlier at the next tier in the supply chain, analogous to
the phase-lagging approach found in the bullwhip effect.
Thus, green supply chain management involves dynamic decisions
with indirect and lagged feedback. Multiple tiers are involved in the
process, whose environmental performance depends on the result of
other supply chain members' decisions, and therefore is subject to
coordination risk that can trigger instabilities in the supply chain
system. This phenomenon is very consistent with that of the bullwhip
effect. Given the uncertainty engendered by product-based regula-
tions, it is reasonable to expect that any environmental speciﬁcations
(and timing to comply) might be tightened (and shortened) as they are
passed upstream, thus amplifying environmental stringency. We use
the term “green bullwhip effect” to describe this dynamic set of
responses to environmental issues in the supply chain.
Table 1
Dynamics of environmental issues in the supply chain: bullwhip effect.
Classic bullwhip effect Green bullwhip effect
General phenomenon Customer orders oscillate; variability in orders
amplify with each tier in the supply chain; delays
also occur as orders pass upstream.
Customer environmental requirements (in the
form of speciﬁcations) become tighter and more
stringent as they pass upstream in a supply chain.
Contributing factors Lead time (lag); processing of demand signals;
order batching; price ﬂuctuation; product
rationing; and shortage gaming.
Response to product and process design
(improvement) lead times; buffers for supplier
and technology risk and uncertainty;
ampliﬁcation of environmental requirements.
Key differences Customer demand-driven; short-term ﬂuctuations
(e.g., daily or quarterly); largely reactionary; and
signal of managerial inefﬁciencies.
Event-driven, deliberate change (e.g., new
regulatory policy); largely anticipatory; long-
term tightening of speciﬁcations; and signal of
customer expectations.
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While we propose that the dynamic nature of environmental
demands being transferred upstream in the supply chain is
analogous to the bullwhip effect, it is helpful to compare and
contrast the classic and green bullwhip effects (Table 1). First, the
classic bullwhip effect is a continuous demand-related phenom-
enon, whereas the green bullwhip effect is an event-driven change
in environmental requirements, such as the infrequent promulga-
tion of new regulations (e.g., Reduction of Hazardous Substances
(RoHS) in Europe), an industry's response to a high-proﬁle
negative incident (e.g., spills), or emergence of new customer
concerns (e.g., Bisphenol A (BPA) in consumer goods). The sporadic
nature of this event-driven change further compounds risk and
uncertainty, as well as complicates any managerial planning and
response. Second, the bullwhip effect is a systematic phenomenon
that managers at each tier seek to attenuate; however, the green
bullwhip effect is a deliberate phenomenon that the ﬁrm triggers
via GSCM practices, speciﬁcally green procurement. Third, the
bullwhip effect is a negative phenomenon that generates excessive
inventories, unsatisfactory customer service, an uncertain produc-
tion planning (Lee et al., 1997b). In contrast, from an environ-
mental perspective, the green bullwhip effect might speed and
expand the adoption of greener supply chain practices.
3. Methodology
Case-based research has been widely used to develop new
insights and understand complex areas of management practice,
thereby contributing to the advancement of theory (Yin, 1984).
Interviews with managers at a small number of sites and ﬁrms
frequently are instrumental in developing a deep understanding of
the dynamics and relationships between different constructs (e.g.,
Tate et al., 2009), and have been encouraged as a means of
providing rich descriptions of phenomena in a natural setting
(Boyer and Swink, 2008). A multi-case approach improves the
potential generalizability of any ﬁndings (Eisenhardt, 1989); to
that end, ﬁve general methodological phases were employed, as is
typical in operations management (Stuart et al., 2002; for a
summary, see also Seuring, 2009). First, research questions are
identiﬁed (described earlier); next, a basic interview instrument is
developed; third, ﬁeld and archival data are gathered; fourth,
interviews are transcribed and analysis performed using coding
schemes and cross-case comparisons; and ﬁnally, ﬁndings are
disseminated to improve validity. Given the emergent and com-
plex nature of this phenomenon, the case data from one supply
chain was collected and analyzed before undertaking the ﬁnal two
cases some years later. Thus, a preliminary conceptualization from
the ﬁrst case (i.e., Samsung SDI, described later) provided the basis
for further testing, elaboration and reﬁnement as the series of case
studies proceeded.
3.1. Case selection
To identify ﬁrm-speciﬁc supply chains, three criteria were used
to capture a diverse set of factors. First, the focus was on
international supply chains that extend into developing countries,
which in turn present challenges with product-based regulations.
Second, at least two industries were sought to explore the range of
factors that might affect any green bullwhip effect, management
responses, and potential generalizability of the green bullwhip
effect (beyond our initial observations in the electronics industry).
Third, it was important to obtain clear ﬁrst-hand or archival data
to understand interactions between three adjacent levels in the
supply chain. While more tiers would certainly be preferable, this
scope was viewed as representative at this exploratory stage of
theory development.
Two contrasting industries were identiﬁed, namely electronics and
fashion apparel (textile), to empirically study the potential for increas-
ing environmental demands in stringency, compressed timelines, and
variability. These industries are informative for several reasons. First,
they serve global markets that are subject to both international
regulations and environmental pressures from multiple stakeholders,
e.g., customers and non-governmental organizations (Carlton, 2006;
Wu et al., 2012). Each industry's markets also are highly interdepen-
dent and a ﬁrm must consider and manage both sourcing from
multiple regions and sales into multiple markets. Countries in which
suppliers operate might have very different environmental regulatory
limits and timelines, relative to those imposed in customer markets.
Thus, ﬁrms must be both responsive to compliance while maintaining
competitiveness. Second, these two industries are somewhat frag-
mented with multiple tiers, comprising ﬁrms of different sizes,
operational strategies, and environmental management capabilities.
Finally, both industries have large markets in the European Union
where multiple product-based regulations have been (and continue to
be) implemented. Of course, given the nature of case research, we
must be cautious about broad generalizations from examining a small
number of ﬁrm-speciﬁc supply chains; however, it is important to
keep in mind that our research objective was to identify and explore
the nature and dynamic form of any bullwhip-like effects for
environmental speciﬁcations with the intent of motivating further
research.
Determining the ideal number of ﬁrms to target for case study
research is not an exact science. Ideally, information gathering
continues until the incremental gains become small, given the
initial research objectives and availability of resources (Miles and
Huberman, 1994). In many studies, depending on the research
objectives, a small number of ﬁrms are reasonable. Here, three
different supply chains, comprising three tiers in each, were
targeted using one ﬁrm as a key informant. Collectively, the intent
was to explore similarities and differences, both within and
between industries (i.e., electronics vs. fashion apparel). While
the unit of analysis was a three-tier portion of three supply chains
(OEM combined with the ﬁrst two tiers of suppliers), a particular
focus was on the dynamics that occur between tiers in a supplier
chain. The intent was not to explore all possible dyadic relation-
ships within these three tiers, but rather to understand how a
variety of dyadic relationships and new environmental regulatory
requirements interact. Overall, the three supply chains were
treated as a series of studies that details, conﬁrms and enhances
our understanding of emerging conceptual insights (Yin, 1984).
Considering that the green bullwhip effect is an event-driven
phenomenon that is observed intermittently over a long-term
time span, comparing three supply chains also can explore
similarities across at least two regulatory deadlines and speciﬁca-
tions. Here, the event for the ﬁrst case study was the promulgation
of RoHS regulations in the European Union (EU). This regulation
bans the use of six harmful materials – cadmium, lead, hexavalent
chrome, mercury, poly-brominated biphenyls (PBB), and poly-
brominated diphenyl ethers (PBDB) – in electronic and electrical
equipment (with some exceptions). While adopted in February
2003, RoHS was initially enforced in July 2006.
As a result, the initial investigation in Samsung SDI (Korea)
began in 2003–2004. As a major ﬁrst-tier supplier, Samsung SDI
provided electrical and electronic components, such as plasma
display panel (PDP), liquid crystal display (LCD), and rechargeable
batteries to global electronics ﬁrms, including Samsung Electro-
nics, Sony, and Matsushita. As a buyer, the ﬁrm sourced from over
400 suppliers (i.e., second-tier suppliers), thereby providing
insight into how environmental requirements are transferred
upstream in the supply chain.
More recently, the EU introduced Registration, Evaluation,
Authorization and Restriction of Chemicals (REACH); this complex
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regulation established reporting obligations in 2008, followed by
phased reductions in speciﬁc chemicals in 2015. Regardless of
industry, all ﬁrms that sell products containing chemicals in
Europe (either produced domestically or imported) are subject to
REACH regulations. The effects of this second event on the supply
chains of two Italian apparel ﬁrms, namely Benetton and Moncler
Group, were explored (2010–2012).
Benetton's supply chain provided a second case study. This
global ﬁrm, with approximately 6400 retail stores, has invested
heavily in R&D, and has focused on style, along with new materials
and production technologies. Benetton directly manufactures
about half of its volume (150 million items), with facilities located
in Europe, India and Asia, where it focused on dyeing, weaving,
and quality controls (some labor-intensive steps are outsourced to
smaller suppliers). The remaining production was completely
outsourced from countries like China, India, Thailand, and Turkey.
For the third case, Moncler Group's supply chain provided an
interesting comparison. The ﬁrm was somewhat smaller (€610
million in 2012), encompassed a range of disparate brands (e.g.,
Moncler, Henry Cottons, Marina Yachting, Coast Weber & Ahaus),
and outsourced all of its production of roughly four million items.
For about 60% of production, the ﬁrm maintained tight control
over the supply chain, as it purchased raw materials and coordi-
nated a network of subcontractors in Italy and Eastern Europe.
3.2. Data sources and collection
Data was collected using interviews, archival materials capturing
longitudinal information (not publicly available), and published
documents. Interviews with managers at a small number of sites
and ﬁrms have been frequently used in developing a deep under-
standing of the dynamics and relationships between different con-
structs (e.g., Klassen and Vereecke, 2012; Tate et al., 2009). At
multiple tiers, interviews were conducted with one or more man-
agers in a ﬁrm (combined with objective data) to assess environ-
mental stringency and implementation timelines, as well as
management practices that respond to environmental regulations.
Given the long-term development and implementation of these
regulatory policies, our case studies were carried out over an
extended period of time. In 2003, an interview protocol was
originally developed comprising both open-ended and directed
questions that explored how Samsung SDI was responding intern-
ally and externally to the compliance demands of OEM customers
regarding RoHS. One research team member participated in a
project that established a green supply chain management system
at Samsung SDI. Later, seven managers – in such areas as quality
assurance, environmental management, R&D, production technol-
ogy management, and procurement – were interviewed to inves-
tigate the ﬁrm's response to customers' RoHS requirements. These
interviews were designed to explore the following questions: (1)
what were the requirements of the ﬁrm's customers regarding
RoHS regulations? (2) How did the managers view these require-
ments and respond to them? and (3) How did any response extend
to its suppliers? In addition to these interviews, Samsung SDI's
internal and public archival documents, along with public docu-
ments of some of its customers, were reviewed dating back as far
as 1999.
This initial case seeded much discussion and thinking, and the
open-ended, structured interview protocol later was slightly
modiﬁed to reﬂect REACH and the apparel industry for use with
our case studies of the supply chains of Benetton and Moncler
Group (Appendix A). For Benetton, interviews were conducted
with managers of R&D for raw materials, as well as safety and
environmental managers. For Moncler Group, ﬁve managers were
interviewed with a particular focus on REACH regulations: chief
operations ofﬁcer (COO), purchasing, planning and control, logis-
tics and quality control. Three aspects were explored: (1) aims,
peculiarities and details of REACH; (2) internal actions adopted by
the ﬁrms to comply with REACH, such as internal deadlines and
thresholds, development of formal organizational structures and
roles within the ﬁrms, and internal routines and procedures; and
(3) external actions adopted, including thresholds and deadlines
for suppliers and supply chain improvement initiatives. With
Moncler Group, additional interviews were conducted directly
with two managers at a major supplier, Limonta (Table 2).
In addition to managerial interviews, which were transcribed for
analysis, multiple sources of evidence, including published and/or
unpublished archival documents and websites, triangulated the
responses and comments obtained during the interviews (Table 2).
Generally, good agreement and consistency were found in the
responses from multiple managers within each ﬁrm about how
other ﬁrms within their supply chainwere addressing environmental
issues. We then followed techniques for cross-case analysis and
tabular displays (Miles and Huberman, 1994), which denoted the
differences and similarities in the synthesis of the cases. Data was
coded using a theoretic frame driven by the underlying research
questions, i.e., what is the nature and form of a green bullwhip effect,
what are the management responses, and what are the implications
(Section 4). This analysis, in turn, provided the basis for developing
an integrative framework and further propositions (Section 5).
4. Case results and development of propositions
Based on our conceptual framework of the green bullwhip
effect and the cross-case analysis of the three supply chains, we
separated the ﬁndings into three areas: stringency of environ-
mental speciﬁcations; timeline for compliance; and management
response to ensure compliance.
4.1. Increasingly tighter limits imposed
Each of these three supply chains experienced, to a greater or
lesser degree, increasingly stringent environmental requirements
being demanded by each tier from its direct suppliers. Looking
ﬁrst at Samsung SDI (ﬁrst-tier), the ﬁrm undertook an assessment
Table 2
Supply chain data collection.
Regulatory change Timing Supply chain (industry) Supply chain stage
2nd-Tier 1st-Tier OEM
RoHS 2003–2004 Samsung SDI (electronics) Key suppliersc Samsung SDIa Branded productsb,c
REACH 2011–2012 Benetton SpA (apparel) Tunisian printing shopsc Benetton's suppliersc Benettona
REACH 2011–2012 Moncler SpA (apparel) Key suppliersc Limontaa,b Moncler Groupa,b
a Interview data was collected from management interviews by the research team.
b Archival data (either public or internal) was collected from printed or published reports.
c Data was collected indirectly by interviewing managers in other ﬁrms in the same supply chain.
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of the implications of EU's newly promulgated RoHS directive. At
that time, the ﬁrm was receiving requests from major OEMs, such
as Matsushita, Samsung Electronics, Nokia, Motorola and other
Chinese electronic manufacturers, to report what materials were
being used and the quantities of speciﬁc substances in its compo-
nents. Further complicating the problem, these OEM customers
were starting to impose varying levels of stringency, differing both
by customer and by restricted substance, many being lower than
the regulatory requirement (and possibly consumer expectations
too) (Table 3).
After analyzing the composition of its components, such as
LCDs, PDPs, CRTs and rechargeable batteries, managers realized
that a quarter of Samsung SDI's products, representing revenues of
€1.5 billion, could be excluded from EU markets by 2006 if
business continued unchanged. In fact, more than 18% of parts,
or 30% of annual purchases of €910 million, contained restricted
materials. Thus, internal changes were far from sufﬁcient; conse-
quently, 431 suppliers (i.e., second-tier) required checking, audit-
ing and monitoring. In response to tighter customer demands,
Samsung SDI developed new detailed requirements and commu-
nicated these to its suppliers. The requirements imposed on
second-tier suppliers tended to mirror the most stringent levels
enforced by Samsung SDI's customers (last row in Table 3), often
substantially much stricter than the RoHS regulation (i.e., fewer
parts per million).
Benetton, facing the recent regulatory requirements of REACH,
adopted a similar approach with its ﬁrst-tier supply base in 2008.
After developing a chemical “blacklist,” Benetton's more stringent
limits ranged from 1/2000th of REACH's legal limits for penta-
chlorophenols (PCPs), to entirely new limits for other substances
that did not have speciﬁc regulatory limits, such as 90 ppm for
lead. In a similar fashion, Moncler Group also planned to impose
greater stringency on its supply chain. For some substances, the
limits on its ﬁrst-tier suppliers were more stringent than Bene-
tton's, such as lead (1 ppm) and PCPs (not detectable) (Table 4).
This variation mirrored the differences between OEMs in the
electronics industry (Table 3).
Limonta, one of the most important suppliers for Moncler
Group, adopted even more stringent requirements for some
chemical substances. This supplier of special fabrics for clothing,
leather goods, and footwear was one of the few European products
with in-house production lines for coating, ﬂocking, resin impreg-
nation and coagulation, as well as a wide range of textile ﬁnishing
processes. Limonta demanded the complete elimination of some
substances such as lead, cadmium and PCP by its suppliers
(second-tier for Moncler Group) (see last row in Table 4).
Proposition 1. The stringency of product- and material-based
environmental requirements tends to increase as they pass upstream
in the supply chain.
4.2. Increasingly shorter timelines imposed
More stringent limits were not the only change that fostered a
green bullwhip effect. Recall that the RoHS regulatory compliance
deadline for Samsung SDI was June 2006. However, customers
imposed much more aggressive timelines that varied considerably
by substance (Fig. 1). In fact, the most lenient deadline allowed by
any OEM customer was 15 months prior to the regulation coming
into force (March 2005), whereas the most aggressive customer
imposed a deadline of 27 months (March 2004). In response,
Samsung SDI initiated a new chemical substance survey of its
Table 3
Initial levels of stringency applied by each tier on its suppliers for Samsung SDI (RoHS).
Supply
chain tier
Firm Substance limits (ppm) demanded from suppliers
Cadmium Lead Hexavalent
chrome
Mercury Poly-
brominated
biphenyls
Poly-
brominated
diphenyl ethers
Regulation RoHS directive 100 1000 1000 1000 1000 1000
OEM Sony 5 nda, 1000b 100 5d, 100c nd nd
Samsung Electronics 5 100 100 100 100 100
LG 10 100 100 100 100 100
HP 100 100c, 1000a 100c, 1000a 100c, nda nd nd
1st Tier Samsung SDI 5 100–1000 100 100 nd nd
Notes: All levels are reported in parts per million (ppm). nd¼not detectable. Lower levels are more stringent.
For example, Samsung SDI demanded that second-tier suppliers have less than 5 ppm of cadmium in all materials and components.
Some ﬁrms had two different limits for different materials:
a All components.
b Soldering.
c Packaging.
d Sony allowed 5 mg per ﬂorescent tube.
Table 4
Initial levels of stringency applied by each tier on its suppliers for Benetton and Moncler Group (REACH).
Supply chain tier Firm Substance limits (ppm) demanded from suppliers
Azo dyes Organo-stannic compounds Lead Cadmium Pentachloro-phenols
Regulation REACH directive 30 1000 na 100 1000
OEM Benetton 20 1–2 90 40 0.5
Moncler Group 30 1000 1 100 0
1st Tier Limonta 30 1000 0 0 0
Note: na¼not provided for clothing.
S.-Y. Lee et al. / Int. J. Production Economics 156 (2014) 39–5144
suppliers (i.e., second-tier) in early 2003, and then required each
supplier to provide assurance that their third-tier suppliers did not
ship banned substances.
A similar compression in timing was pushed by Benetton and
Moncler Group. We explored in more detail one hazardous
chemical, e.g. phthalates, which illustrated both the complexity
of supply chain dynamics, as well as responses that Benetton and
Industries employed. Phthalates are organic compounds that are
used to soften plastics and other materials to make them easier to
be processed; they are persistent, bioaccumulative and toxic.
REACH set a limit of 0.1% and 0.5% by weight for products, for
children (r3 years old) and adults, respectively. Companies were
required to be compliant by January 1, 2011. Subsequently,
phthalates were to be eliminated completely by February 2015.
In 2008, Benetton initially set the limit of 0.1% for all customers
globally, and following further review, decided to completely eliminate
the use of phthalates. The zero tolerance for phthalates partly resulted
from pressure exerted by Greenpeace, an environmental non-
governmental organization that was perceived to greatly inﬂuence
public opinion worldwide. Within the Benetton's supply chain, for
example, phthalates were used by Tunisian print shops. The ﬁrm's
managers maintained tight control over and directly coordinated these
second-tier suppliers. Printing shops tended to be small ﬁrms serving
multiple customers, although Benetton might account for up to 80% of
their business. In January 2009, inspections were made of about 10
Tunisian printing shops, and auditors compiled a list of all materials
(such as glues and colorants) that contained phthalates. Based on this
inspection, Benetton imposed a deadline of January 1, 2010 for printing
shops to eliminate the phthalates, ﬁve years ahead of the REACH
deadline.
Moncler Group's concerns about the growing emphasis on green
criteria in the marketplace prompted the ﬁrm to become more
proactive on environmental issues. Starting in 2009, Moncler Group
imposed a limit of 0.1% for phthalates on its suppliers (i.e., ﬁrst-tier),
setting a limit more stringent than REACH and requiring conformance
to this lower limit two years ahead of the 2011 deadline. Subsequently,
in 2012, the ﬁrm incorporated the new requirement for zero-
phthalates in the supply contracts for the upcoming 2013–2014 fall-
winter season, two years ahead of 2015 REACH regulatory deadline for
zero phthalates. Like Samsung and Benetton, the ﬁrm created a
temporal buffer that will allow it ﬁx tardiness by or implementation
shortcomings of ﬁrst-tier suppliers. Fig. 2 summarizes the timeline for
eliminating phthalates within Benetton's and Moncler Group's supply
chains. The two black-bolded arrows measure the extent to which the
two ﬁrms moved ahead the REACH deadlines.
Returning to the electronics industry, public documents such as
environmental and sustainability reports indicate that this timeline
compression for RoHS extended beyond our case of Samsung SDI
(Fig. 3). For example, a number of OEM companies rushed to declare
aggressive timelines (Phase III), along with interim compliance
Fig. 2. Deadlines imposed on suppliers to reduce phthalates by Benetton and Moncler Group.
Fig. 1. Deadlines imposed on Samsung SDI to reduce RoHS substances by OEM customers.
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deadlines for some substances (Phase II), such as lead. Furthermore,
these deadlines were accompanied with the requirements being
clearly communicated, and additional monitoring being introduced
(Phase I). As a result, focal ﬁrms adopted a phase-leading approach of
having preparatory phases to comply with the deadline using a
phased, accelerated approach (Fig. 3).
Proposition 2. The timeline for product-based environmental
requirements tends to compress with each successive upstream tier
in the supply chain.
4.3. Management actions in response to the green bullwhip effect
Across the three supply chains studied, managers reported a
variety of different practices driven by the need to comply with
regulatory and customer environmental requirements. Initially,
our case study OEMs in electronics and fashion goods attempted
to inﬂuence their supply chains by imposing stringent environ-
mental standards using a compressed timeline. However, this
approach was forced to evolve over time as the ﬁrms attempted
to effectively manage suppliers. As detailed below, further exam-
ination and follow-up questioning pointed toward four basic
managerial responses: replace, negotiate, accommodate, and col-
laborate. Collectively, these responses reﬂect outcome-based and
behavioral approaches for managing supply chain risk, consistent
with the agency theory (Zu and Kaynak, 2012). However, it is
important to note that each ﬁrm often employed multiple
approaches with different suppliers for a variety of reasons.
The ﬁrst response, namely replace, was observed in Samsung SDI's
procurement policy of ‘meet-or-give-up’ (Table 5). Samsung SDI
classiﬁed the relative importance of its suppliers into four categories,
S/A/B/C, with “S” being the most important (i.e., strategic), ranging to
“C” being commodity providers. Generally, the limit imposed on its
suppliers mirrored the lowest, most stringent limit enforced by its
customers (with some notable exceptions, e.g., lead, discussed later). In
response, its suppliers had to provide assurance that all materials,
parts and components did not contain restricted materials; otherwise,
they could be replaced. Benetton identiﬁed a chemical “blacklist” of
toxics to eliminate, and pushed ﬁrst-tier suppliers to comply. Further-
more, this ﬁrm imposed on all tiers an aggressive timeline to phase
out phthalates. When one printing shop resisted Benetton's direction,
the ﬁrm replaced the supplier. This ‘replace’ response is consistent
with GSCM practices that simplistically focus on controlling outputs
relative to particular performance criteria.
The second response, negotiate, allowed for some adjustment from
the initial level of stringency imposed by downstream customers. For
example, Samsung SDI initially received environmental requirements
with varying levels of stringency and timelines, differing both by OEM
customer and substance (see Table 3). The costs for Samsung SDI to
meet both the most stringent limit and aggressive timeline were
onerous. Instead, the ﬁrm leveraged the variation between customers
to convince the most aggressive customers to relax their deadlines, as
long as progress continued. Such negotiation was possible because
Samsung SDI had a relatively high power within the supply chain,
based both on its size and capabilities. Yet, despite this apparent
power, customers still imposed more stringent limits than dictated by
regulation (e.g., hexavalent chrome).
The third response, termed accommodate, was reported in the
Moncler Group case. Relative to Benetton, this ﬁrm attempted to
impose even more stringent limits for two substances, lead
(1 ppm) and PCPs (not detectable). Much like many ﬁrms, Moncler
Group classiﬁed the relative importance of its suppliers into A/B/C
categories, with “A” being the most critical for its product
portfolio. However, unlike either Samsung SDI or Benetton, sup-
plier pushback was very strong. While the majority of A-category
suppliers indicated their willingness to comply with Moncler
Group's more stringent limits, this response was far from uni-
versal, with 20% rejecting these more stringent limits outright
(Table 6). Moreover, the proportion rejecting more stringent limits
grew larger with each lower category of supplier. Managers at
Fig. 3. Timelines imposed by major OEMs in electronics industry: ﬁrst-tier supplier compliance with RoHS.
Sources: Mitsubishi Electric Group's Environmental Sustainability Reports 2002 and 2004; Toshiba's Environmental Report 2003 and Corporate Social Responsibility Report
2005; Matsushita Electric Group's Environmental Report 2000 and Sustainability Report 2003; Electrolux's Sustainability Report 2004; Phillips's Sustainability Report 2004;
Sony's Social and Environmental Report 2002
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Moncler Group attributed this resistance to the ﬁrm's lack of
market inﬂuence with their European suppliers.
Follow-up interviews with an illustrative supplier (Category A),
Limonta, corroborated Moncler Group' perceptions. Limonta was
one of the most critical suppliers to Moncler Group. Managers here
indicated that their products had complied with REACH limits
since 2008. However, more stringent requirements from individual
customers were considered within the broader context of that
customer's importance and bargaining power. For Moncler Group,
Limonta's management refused the more stringent contract
because the estimated additional costs of fulﬁlling more stringent
requirements were not offset by sufﬁcient sales volume. In the
end, Moncler Group abandoned its initial efforts to impose stricter
requirements; instead, REACH limits were explicitly incorporated
into new contracts (2013–2014 season) globally.
Upstream, Limonta reacted similarly, at least in part. The ﬁrm
forced its suppliers (i.e., second-tier) to comply with REACH limits
well ahead any pressure from its customers (since 2008). Every six
months Limonta updated its blacklist of chemicals, and conducted
in-house and external monitoring. Managers considered a suppli-
er's capability to be compliant with REACH standards to be a
critical factor in vendor selection and rating. Those suppliers that
do not comply with REACH were eliminated from the vendor list
and alternative suppliers are sought.
The fourth response, “collaborate,” combines some elements of
both accommodate and negotiate responses; however the key
difference is active investment to develop new capabilities in the
supplier, consistent with the GSCM literature. For example, Sam-
sung SDI decided to pursue collaboration based on the combination
of supplier criticality and size. For the combined SþA categories,
small- and medium-sized suppliers accounted for 81% of these 111
suppliers. Management recognized their limited capabilities in
environmental management, and rather than force suppliers to
achieve RoHS compliance on their own, technical and managerial
assistance was offered. Initiatives included environmental training,
education, and technical support for analyzing material composi-
tion. Joint development also was undertaken with soldering ven-
dors to develop lead-free soldering processes. As a result, Samsung
SDI and its supply chain met the environmental demand from OEM
customers and markets one year in advance of the actual regulation
deadline (albeit a small delay from the original planned timeline for
compliance).
Benetton reported a similar response. In January 2009, the ﬁrm
inspected Tunisian printing shops – second-tier suppliers – that
were required to eliminate phthalates from glues and colorants.
Not surprisingly, some suppliers were entirely unaware of this
requirement. Multiple suppliers faced an even more complex
problem: phthalates are highly volatile and could easily migrate
from one product to another. For example, contaminants could
migrate from another customer's printed products to Benetton's
when they were cured in the same oven at different times. And
duplicating large capital equipment, such as curing ovens, proved
too costly for these suppliers. Thus, these printing shops were
forced to gradually eliminate phthalates from all products across
their entire customer portfolio. Those printing shops that were
willing to collaborate were assisted by Benetton to change their
production processes to handle phthalate-free materials. Those
that did not were replaced.
In summary, ﬁrms and their multiple tiers of suppliers
responded in a number of ways the complex implications of green
bullwhip effect. Buyer–supplier relationships, reﬂecting power,
supplier substitutability, and interdependency can inﬂuence which
response is adopted.
Proposition 3. Supply chain responses to the green bullwhip effect
vary, as the characteristics of buyer–supplier relationships differ.
5. Discussion
5.1. An integrative model
Collectively, as the research team tried to structure the cross-
case analysis, a conceptual model emerged, as depicted in Fig. 4.
Table 5
Supply chain responses.
Case Response
Replace Accommodate Negotiate Collaborate
Samsung SDI Suppliers in B/C categories
were replaced if they could
not meet the requirements.
– Different customers required varying
limits for the same toxic substances.
Openly discussing differences that
provided convergence around a
“compromise” limit and deadline.
Suppliers S/A were offered training
and education. Joint development
was also undertaken as need, e.g.,
lead-free soldering.
Benetton A Tunisian printing shop resisted
Benetton's proposed limits.
– – Tunisian printing shops are offered
consultation, encouragement and
technological expertise.
Moncler Group – Powerful suppliers dictated
their
terms to customers based
on maximum allowable
legal requirements.
Looked at tighter limits over longer
term, with more time for some suppliers
to adjust. Supplier (Limonta)
adjustments could be made if volumes
were sufﬁcient.
–
Rationale Impose the lowest limit
of downstream customers. Generally,
customers have much greater power.
Substitute suppliers that are readily
available, and transition costs are
modest.
Powerful suppliers
counteract customer
demands, and dictate their
offering based on allowable
legal requirements.
A combination of playing within
a single tier (e.g., customers)
against each other, and ﬁnding
a basis for collective agreement.
Limited supplier capabilities require
speciﬁc investment by customer.
These suppliers might be critical; few
alternatives might exist, or are
strategic in nature.
Table 6
Supplier response to more stringent limits imposed by Moncler Group.
Category of
suppliers
Supplier response
Accepted (%) Revised (%) Rejected (%)
A 67 13 20
B 42 21 37
C 32 18 50
Note: All suppliers were willing to meet the basic REACH regulatory limits.
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This general framework differentiates among the four manage-
ment responses based on the form of the supply chain relationship
and the relative balance of environmental management capabil-
ities (i.e., which ﬁrm has the stronger set of environmental
capabilities). It should be stressed that this vertical axis must be
assessed separately for dyadic pairs at each tier in the supply
chain, and may also differ by the speciﬁc nature of the environ-
mental requirement (e.g., lead vs. phthalates). This conceptual
model is not meant to be deﬁnitive, but rather interpretive of the
synthesis of our ﬁnding. More research is needed to explore
whether other factors explain the management responses, or
additional responses might be possible.
The horizontal axis is deﬁned by the manner in which adjacent
tiers of the supply chain interact. At two extremes of a spectrum,
buyer–supplier relationships are often characterized as transactional
vs. partnership-based. While a relationship entails many character-
istics, an aggregate measure is reﬂected in a supplier category rating
system (e.g., Samsung SDI's S/A/B/C and Moncler Group's A/B/C). A
transactional relationship seeks to control outputs based on parti-
cular performance criteria with little mutual adjustment
(Williamson, 1985); both buyers and suppliers can observe outcomes,
and buyers reward or penalize suppliers based on measured perfor-
mance (Ekanayake, 2004). In contrast, a partnership-based relation-
ship emphasizes the value of building each party's capabilities
toward common objectives rather than speciﬁc short-term outcomes.
This relationship is built on communication, mutual trust, commit-
ment, and inter-dependency that can be achieved through asset-
speciﬁc investment between a small number of customers and
suppliers. Behavior-based management mechanisms, involving the
direct interaction of the focal ﬁrm with its supply chain partners,
jointly improve the performance of each party (Eisenhardt, 1989; Zu
and Kaynak, 2012).
The vertical axis characterizes whether the customer or sup-
plier in each dyadic relationship at each tier, on balance, is likely to
be more skillful in dealing new environmental requirements, to
have greater underlying technical capabilities, and to have more
available resources (Parmigiani et al., 2011). In general, if the
customer is perceived as more capable, the environmental require-
ments are more likely to be ampliﬁed as those requirements are
passed upstream between that particular dyad. For example,
Benetton's strict restrictions and compressed timelines prevailed
with its small suppliers that often poorly understood both the
regulatory demands, and the technical means by which those
demands might be met. Similar challenges arose with Samsung
SDI and the elimination of lead in solder. In contrast, if the supplier
has stronger environmental capabilities, the stringency and timing
of new environmental requirements are likely to be moderated.
Examples include suppliers refusing the greater stringency of
Moncler Group (with the customer having little technical
recourse), and Samsung SDI's negotiation with its OEM customers
toward some middle ground.
This framework provides a clearer explanation about why and
how ﬁrms differ in responding to a given speciﬁc change, all else
being equal. First, under circumstances in which the customer has
a stronger set of environmental capabilities and their relationships
are transactional (i.e., upper-right cell), a customer can attempt to
impose more stringent environmental requirements with a threat
of replacing an uncooperative supplier. In part, the customer can
assess the risk that a supplier might fail to comply, combined with
any expected losses that could occur, and compare that to the costs
of bringing in an alternative supplier (Cousins et al., 2004). To
avoid such risks, customers begin by imposing stricter limits on
these high-risk suppliers, i.e., amplifying environmental require-
ments; transactional relationships also allow the customer to seek
substitute suppliers with relatively low transition costs. Samsung
SDI and its B/C category suppliers (“transactional relationships”)
are an example for this ‘impose, then replace if needed’ response.
Facing varying environmental demands from OEM customers,
Samsung SDI imposed the most stringent requirement onto its
suppliers; however, the manner in which such environmental
criteria were satisﬁed was left to suppliers in the B/C categories.
Second, when a supply chain has a transactional relationship in
which the supplier holds the balance of environmental capabilities,
then the environmental requirements are likely to moderate or
attenuate under an “accommodate” response (lower-right cell). Under
these circumstances, the environmental demands and threat of
supplier replacement by the customer are less credible. As a result,
the supplier can refuse any overly burdensome requirements from
customers, as long as it complies with the basic legal requirements.
Moreover, if one or more powerful suppliers counteract customer
demands, and dictate their offering based on allowable legal require-
ments or another internal standard, the buyer must adjust. As
discussed earlier, Moncler Group and its suppliers provide one such
example; after the ﬁrm attempted to impose greater stringency,
accommodation was made for Limonta.
Third, when supply chain partners are partnership-based at a
particular tier, and the supplier has greater environmental cap-
abilities, the supplier and customer are more likely to evolve
toward a negotiate response (i.e., lower-left cell). Partnership
indicates mutual commitment, possibly based on a long-term
contract, which also can engender higher transaction costs if
supplier substitution were considered. Moreover, the strong envir-
onmental capabilities of the supplier help customers to under-
stand (from a trusted source) the costs of a more stringent
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Fig. 4. The green bullwhip effect: expected responses and implications based on the nature of dyadic supply chain relationships and environment capabilities.
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environmental requirement. As a result, both parties engage in a
collaborative negotiation that can moderate or attenuate the
requirements of the customers, as we observed with Samsung
SDI and its OEM customers. As a dominant and reliable display
panel provider, this supplier had built deep relationships with
international brands. Based partly on customers' conﬁdence in
Samsung SDI's environmental capabilities, some customers
relaxed their initial environmental limits and deadlines.
Finally, a collaborative response is likely to be utilized by
supply chain partners when a customer holds the greater balance
of environmental capabilities (upper-left cell). However, the per-
ceived risk of a suppliers' inability to comply (even with collabora-
tion) prompts ampliﬁcation of either the level of stringency, a
more aggressive timeline, or both. Thus, the partnership relation-
ship pre-empts potential supplier substitution, except as a last
resort. Ideally, the partners come to jointly develop new technol-
ogies, products and/or processes in order to meet the environ-
mental demands. Samsung SDI and its S/A-category suppliers
pursued this approach to eliminate lead. However, with very
limited competitive or environmental capabilities, as illustrated
by Benetton and its second-tier suppliers (i.e., Tunisian printing
shops), the customer might bear most of this collaborative burden.
One might ask why Benetton did not simply replace the small
Tunisian suppliers? Here one must consider that the relational nature
of a dyadic relationship need not arise from only the strategic,
potential irreplaceable nature of a supplier. Instead, upgrading a
supplier's environmental capabilities in a developing economy can
be viewed as contributing to the buying ﬁrm's social bottom line, and
enhance the long-term commitment of small supplier.
Collectively, the green bullwhip effect is a dynamic phenomenon,
illustrating that as periodic, signiﬁcant changes in environmental
regulation occur, these demands ﬂow upstream in the supply chain
with varying consequences. Thus, product-based environmental
regulations prompt signiﬁcant improvement, and ﬁrms such as HP
(or other OEM customers of Samsung SDI), Benetton, and Moncler
Group are initially targeted by tougher regulations. Supplier uncer-
tainty prompts these ﬁrms to impose more stringent requirements –
tightened speciﬁcations and a shortened compliance deadline – on
their suppliers in order to create ‘capability’ and ‘time’ buffers.
Moreover, the multiplicity of management responses, determined
over an extended period of time as supplier capabilities become
clearer, creates further uncertainty and variability. Thus, the green
bullwhip effect and the green supply chain responses result, in part,
from iterative interactions between buyers and suppliers. For exam-
ple, a buyer's initial decision about how to transfer new environ-
mental pressures upstream stimulates supplier change; the supplier's
initial response whether to accept or refuse to comply with more
stringent requirements; the buyer's response whether to replace the
supplier, accommodate a supplier's refusal, or help the supplier meet
more stringent requirements; the supplier's response whether to offer
a counter proposal; and other responses across multiple suppliers.
5.2. Managerial implications
The ﬁndings of this research provide at least ﬁve implications for
managerial practice. First, stepping back, one must acknowledge that
OEMs face a time-consuming set of tasks to appraise the environ-
mental risks transferred through each tier in the supply chain. The
complexity of many tiers, along with many materials, parts and
subassemblies, must be combined with an incomplete and uncertain
understanding about suppliers' intentions and capabilities (Speier et
al., 2011). Managers rationally build in buffers, both for more stringent
limits on chemical substances, and for meeting early deadlines for
compliance. These buffers, much like the quantity and time buffers of
the classic bullwhip effect, are perceived by managers to reduce any
risks of non-compliance.
Not dissimilar from the “cost of quality,” buffers implicitly
reﬂect the uncertainties and subsequent costs in three categories:
appraisal, failure-recovery and prevention. Appraisal takes time,
often involving hundreds of suppliers, over roughly a year for both
Samsung SDI and Benetton. Moreover, if suppliers prove incapable
of meeting the requirements, or refuse to do so, time must be
available to look for other suppliers or for negotiations (i.e., failure-
recovery). In other situations, suppliers require time to re-engineer
the equipment, seek alternative materials and assess their perfor-
mance and/or pass requirements upstream to yet another tier (i.e.,
prevention). Managers should understand the characteristics of
their supply chain, the nature of buyer–supplier relationships, and
ultimately, the most effective response to push environmental
requirements upstream in the supply chain.
Second, given the challenges and uncertainty surrounding
environmental issues in the supply chain, managers must foster
the development of environmental capabilities across multiple
tiers in their supply chain. As environmental requirements in
many industries move upstream with more stringent limits and
tighter timelines, these ampliﬁed requirements rapidly impinge on
SME suppliers operating in developing countries. Yet, SMEs are the
least likely to have the technical capabilities to meet very stringent
limits and tight timelines. OEMs and ﬁrst-tier suppliers must
account for the time needed for collaboration, including education,
training, technical study, and managerial assistance, and if neces-
sary, co-development of new technologies.
Third, ﬁrms must consider the value of information (i.e., visibility)
about suppliers' environmental capabilities and performance. The less
information available – conversely, the greater the uncertainty – about
supplier capabilities, the greater the buffers needed to manage the
risk. By way of analogy from the classic bullwhip effect, greater
demand visibility serves as an effective antidote (Lee et al., 1997a).
For managers, evolving customer and regulatory demands require on-
going attention to ensure that accurate information is quickly cap-
tured, and then translated into the appropriate limits and timelines.
Suppliers at multiple tiers also need to be quickly informed of
expected changes while they remain under study, without necessarily
waiting until ﬁnal regulations are promulgated.
Fourth, the green bullwhip might encourage OEMs to develop
stronger supply chains with deeper relationships (Camuffo et al.,
2007), which in turn can respond with greater certainty, thus
reducing the need for buffers such as greater stringency and
compressed timeline. Partnership-based relationships facilitate
coordination, collaboration, knowledge transfer and adaptation
across the supply chain (Krause et al., 2007). Moreover, collabora-
tion can strengthen the environmental capabilities of multiple
tiers (Vachon and Klassen, 2008), and can assist with adapting to
future, additional environmental regulations.
One ﬁnal point should be raised for further consideration: the
classic bullwhip effect is typically viewed negatively, creating waste,
reducing responsiveness and hurting customer service. In contrast, the
green bullwhip effect is not necessarily a negative phenomenon, and
might create positive value that exceeds direct costs. For example,
reducing or eliminating phthalates ahead of regulations provides
customers with a product that is greener and/or safer.
Moreover, the green bullwhip effect has potential spillover effects
in communities upstream in the supply chain that are far removed
from the regulated point-of-sale. From a public policy perspective,
new limits on hazardous substances tend to be often imposed initially
by regulators or customers in developed countries. Yet, many ﬁrst- and
second-tier suppliers are located in developing countries where
regulators do not necessarily directly impose the same limits. Com-
bined, these tendencies suggest that at times, as was the case with
Benetton, the increasingly stringent limits will be implemented sooner
in SME suppliers. These suppliers are pushed to move ahead of any
regulations in their local markets, yielding positive beneﬁts for local
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customers, as well as worker safety and community health (Klassen
and Vereecke, 2012).
5.3. Limitations and future research
Several limitations of this research suggest potential directions for
future research. First, the ﬁndings and implications are based on case
research with only a small number of ﬁrms at each tier of three
supply chains. While one of the major advantages of the case research
is the depth of the information that can be collected, a major concern
is the extent to which the conclusions can be broadly generalized. To
expand generalizability, our propositions should be tested with
extended and/or repeated case studies applied to a variety of
industries and product-based regulatory events. Second, the range
of constructs considered in the framework explaining different
responses of our case ﬁrms and their consequences was exploratory
in nature. This suggested framework should be extended, ﬁrst by
considering additional factors, such as the levels of pre-existing
institutional environmental pressures (Reid and Toffel, 2009), and
second, by explicitly capturing the evolution of practices over time at
the supply chain level, rather than at the ﬁrm level (Zadek, 2004).
Third, the data for our case studies focused on the requirements
that OEMs (i.e., Benetton and Moncler Group) and ﬁrst-tier
suppliers (i.e., Samsung SDI and Limonta) placed on adjacent
suppliers, relative to regulations. Further studies could examine
the environmental requirements imposed by tiers further
upstream on their suppliers (i.e., second-, third-, and higher-
tiered suppliers). Fourth, the dynamics of environmental issues
in the supply chain might vary from country to country since
contextual differences can matter. For instance, corporate envir-
onmental management differs depending on the policies and
culture of countries (e.g., Klassen and Angell, 1998; Jeswani et al.,
2008). Thus, future research should investigate how institutional
differences cause differences in the green bullwhip effect. Finally,
beyond the legal environmental requirements, the importance of
managing social and/or sustainability issues is becoming the focus
of increasing attention by end-consumers and NGOs, among
others (Seuring and Müller, 2008; Klassen and Vereecke, 2012).
It is unclear how this phenomenon might extend to other aspects
of sustainability, as reﬂected in the similarities and differences
between environmental and social issues in the supply chain.
6. Conclusions
Firms are increasingly being required to meet new product-based
environmental requirements driven by ratcheting customer expecta-
tions, urgent NGO demands or more stringent government regula-
tions. However, managers ﬁnd it challenging to ensure that all
purchased materials and components meet these new requirements
in timely manner. In response to these issues, our study of three ﬁrm-
speciﬁc supply chains in the electronics and apparel industries
identiﬁed three critical aspects that pointed to the concept of a green
bullwhip effect. First, the need to assure full regulatory compliance
prompted managers to establish buffers, in terms of greater stringency
and compressed timelines, to adjust for and mitigate both foreseen
and unforeseen risks. Furthermore, ﬁrst-tier suppliers seek to apply
the same logic to second-tier suppliers, albeit now derived from OEM
requirements, thereby often creating even more stringent limits or
more aggressive timelines – a green bullwhip effect.
Second, our study revealed four generic management
responses that contributed to the green bullwhip effect to varying
degrees: replace, collaborate, accommodate and negotiate. These
responses were not applied universally at every tier in the supply
chain, but instead varied based on the nature of buyer–supplier
relationship at each tier, the balance of environmental capabilities
between buyer and supplier at each tier, and the networking of
suppliers and customers (i.e., different buyers might use the same
supplier or vice versa). Moreover, the use of the ﬁrst two
responses, namely replace and collaborate, stimulated ampliﬁca-
tion from increased stringency, tighter timelines, or both. In
contrast, the latter two responses, namely accommodation and
negotiation, modiﬁed or attenuated initial demands for greater
environmental stringency or tighter deadlines (while still comply-
ing with regulatory requirements).
Finally, while the classic bullwhip effect creates negative conse-
quences from high levels of inventory and poor customer service, the
environmental bullwhip has more subtle implications. Yes, short-term
costs likely increase as OEMs are forced to reduce the use of less
expensive (but toxic) substances. However, for smaller suppliers
located in developing countries, collaboration with customers that
possess strong environmental capabilities can foster the development
of upgraded supplier capabilities. Thus, these suppliers move ahead of
any regulations in their local markets, yielding spillover beneﬁts for
local customers, workers and communities. Thus, the broader network
of stakeholders might beneﬁt to a greater degree than customers from
a green bullwhip effect.
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Appendix A. Interview instrument
Questions on general information and management of the
relationships
(1) Describe ﬁrm background: history, products, # of employees,
and annual sales (total and regional).
(2) If the ﬁrm is a buyer (e.g., OEM): describe the characteristics of
suppliers (# of suppliers, demographic of suppliers, and major
suppliers); describe the relationships between the ﬁrm and its
suppliers, including contract type, long-term partnership,
bargaining power, and inter-dependency.
(3) If the ﬁrm is a supplier: describe the characteristics of
customers (# of customers and demographic of customers
and major customers); describe the relationships between the
ﬁrm and its customers, including contract type, long-term
partnership, bargaining power, and inter-dependency.
Questions on environmental management
(1) Describe the ﬁrm's environmental management practices, includ-
ing environmental management systems (e.g., ISO 14001), formal
and informal organizational structures to deal with environmental
issues, the ﬁrm's environmental investment, and the ﬁrm's gen-
eral stance towards environmental issues.
(2) Describe the changes in the abovementioned environmental
management of the ﬁrm over time.
Questions on response to environmental regulations for ﬁrms as a
customer
(1) Describe when and how the ﬁrm recognized the environmen-
tal regulations (RoHS and/or REACH).
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(2) Describe what the ﬁrm's initial reactions to the regulations were.
(3) Describe what internal actions adopted by the ﬁrm to comply
with the regulations were, including thresholds, formal orga-
nizational structures and roles within the ﬁrm, and internal
routines and procedures.
(4) Describe any changes in those internal actions over time.
(5) Describe what external actions adopted by the ﬁrm to comply
with the regulations were, including the thresholds and dead-
lines for suppliers and supply chain improvement initiatives.
(6) Describe any changes in those external actions over time.
Questions on response to environmental requirements as a supplier
(1) Describe what the requirements of the ﬁrm's customers
regarding the RoHS and/or REACH regulations were. Describe
any differences among customers, if they were.
(2) When did the ﬁrm's customers place such requirements?
Describe any differences among customers, if they were.
(3) What was the ﬁrm's initial reaction to such customers'
requirements?
(4) Describe what internal actions adopted by the ﬁrm to comply
with the requirements were, including thresholds, formal
organizational structures and roles within the ﬁrm, and inter-
nal routines and procedures.
(5) Describe any changes in those internal actions over time.
(6) Describe what external actions adopted by the ﬁrm to comply
with the regulations were, including the thresholds and dead-
lines for suppliers and supply chain improvement initiatives.
(7) Describe any changes in those external actions over time.
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